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1 2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	
3	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	
4	v.	14 CR 34
5	DINESH D'SOUZA,	
6	Defendant.	
7	x	
8		New York, N.Y. May 20, 2014
9		9:00 A.M.
10		
11	Before:	
12	HON. RICHARD M. BEI	RMAN,
13		District Judge
14		
15	APPEARANCES	
16 17	PREET BHARARA United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York	
18	CARRIE COHEN PAUL KRIEGER Assistant United States Attorneys	
19	BENJAMIN BRAFMAN	
20	ALEX SPIRO Attorneys for Defendant	
21	Accorneys for Defendanc	
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1 (In open court; defendant present)

THE COURT: Good morning, everybody, please be seated.

So just a few preliminaries.

For one, Mr. Brafman, I have been handed a document called an Advice Of Rights form which is signed both by yourself and Mr. D'Souza. And it advises a defendant of certain rights that they are giving up by entering a guilty plea agreement. And it states, among other things, that both you and he believe that there are not any meritorious defenses to the count, or counts, to which he intends to plead guilty.

So my question is whether you and he, before signing it, had an adequate opportunity to go through that advice of rights form.

MR. BRAFMAN: Yes. And we have discussed, both his rights and whatever defenses might be available, for several weeks now, extensively.

THE COURT: Mr. D'Souza, you went through that carefully, that Advice Of Rights form with Mr. Brafman before you signed it?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I did.

THE COURT: Thank you.

I have also reviewed a copy of the letter agreement which is a plea agreement dated, on the first page, May 19th, 2014, and signed by both Mr. Brafman and Mr. D'Souza, today -- May 19 is correct. And today.

And did you each, Mr. Brafman first, have an 1 opportunity to discuss, in detail, this plea agreement between 2 3 the government and the defense? 4 MR. BRAFMAN: Yes, your Honor. We received a copy 5 yesterday, and we spent a fair amount of time explaining it and 6 discussing it with Mr. D'Souza, signed a copy last night, and 7 we signed an original copy this morning. You should have a copy dated May 20 or May 19. 8 9 THE COURT: I have one dated May 19, and I have one 10 also -- I guess the original, then, is the one dated May 20, 2014. 11 12 I do have both copies, thank you. 13 MR. BRAFMAN: Yes, sir. 14 THE COURT: Thank you. 15 And Mr. D'Souza, you went over that agreement, the 16 plea agreement, carefully with Mr. Brafman before you signed it 17 this morning? 18 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I did. 19 THE COURT: Thank you very much. 20 So, Ms. Cohen, the text of both those plea agreements, 21 are they exactly the same? 22 MS. COHEN: Yes, they are, your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Thank you. 24 So it's clear from these documents that Mr. D'Souza

wishes to change his plea to the indictment in this case,

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particularly with respect to count one of the indictment, from not guilty to guilty. And is my understanding correct, Mr.

Brafman, and is that the purpose of today's proceeding?

MR. BRAFMAN: Yes, your Honor.

Preliminarily, I wanted to thank you, sir, for all of the time you have spent dealing with the complicated legal issues that had to be resolved. But the defendant, this morning, has authorized me to withdraw his previously entered plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to count one of the indictment in satisfaction of the entire indictment, with the understanding that count one of the indictment would be dismissed and that count two will be dismissed at the time of sentence.

THE COURT: Count two. Thank you. I appreciate your remarks.

So, let's ask Christine Murray to swear in Mr. D'Souza at this time.

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Sir, if you can stand. Thank you. And raise your right hand, please.

(Defendant sworn)

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Thank you, sir, you may be seated.

THE COURT: Mr. D'Souza, you should know that now you are under oath. Your answers to my questions must be truthful and could subject you to the criminal penalties of perjury or making a false statement if you were to not answer truthfully,

1 you realize that? 2 THE DEFENDANT: T do. 3 THE COURT: So before I accept your quilty plea, as we 4 have been discussing preliminarily, I'm going to ask you a 5 series of questions. And the purpose of these questions is to 6 establish that you, in fact, wish to plead quilty, that you do 7 so voluntarily and knowingly, and because you are guilty, and 8 also to establish just what rights you will be giving up by 9 pleading guilty. So if you don't understand any of my 10 questions, or if at any time you wish to consult with Mr. 11 Brafman for any reason, please say so and I'll give you as much 12 time as you need to consult with your attorney. 13 It's essential to a valid plea that you understand 14 every question before you answer. 15 Can we start by asking you, please, to state your full 16 name. 17 THE DEFENDANT: It's Dinesh D'Souza. 18 THE COURT: And you are, how old? 19 THE DEFENDANT: I'm 53. 20 THE COURT: And you're a U.S. citizen? 21 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 22 THE COURT: And how far did you go in school?

been, under the care, first of all, of a medical doctor?

THE DEFENDANT: I have a BA from Dartmouth College.

THE COURT: And are you now, or have you recently

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E5k0dsop 1 THE DEFENDANT: No. THE COURT: And how about a mental health physician? 2 3 THE DEFENDANT: No. 4 THE COURT: And how is your health today, generally 5 speaking? 6 THE DEFENDANT: Just fine. 7 THE COURT: And your mental health? THE DEFENDANT: No issues. 8 9 THE COURT: And have you ever been addicted to drugs 10 or to alcohol? 11 THE DEFENDANT: 12 THE COURT: Ever been hospitalized or treated for any addictions? 13 14 THE DEFENDANT: No. 15 THE COURT: And have you taken any drugs or medicine or pills, or drunk any alcoholic beverages in the past 24 16 17 hours? 18 THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor. THE COURT: Nothing that might impact your answers to 19 20 my questions here this morning? 21 THE DEFENDANT: Nothing. 22 THE COURT: Again, I'm going to ask how you feel, 23 first of all, physically, today. 24 THE DEFENDANT: I feel fine.

THE COURT: And mentally?

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1	THE DEFENDANT: I'm fine, your Honor.		
2	THE COURT: And you understand what's happening in		
3	this proceeding here in court today?		
4	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.		
5	THE COURT: So here's a question for the lawyers.		
6	Do either of you have any doubts or concerns as to Mr.		
7	D'Souza's competence to plead at this time.		
8	Ms. Cohen?		
9	THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor.		
10	MR. BRAFMAN: None whatsoever, your Honor.		
11	THE COURT: Nor do I.		
12	Based on the record today, including Mr. D'Souza's		
13	testimony, I find that he is competent to plead guilty.		
14	Mr. D'Souza, have you had a full opportunity to		
15	discuss all aspects of this case with your attorney, Mr.		
16	Brafman?		
17	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I have, your Honor.		
18	THE COURT: Including any possible defenses that you		
19	might have to this case, in particular, count one of the		
20	indictment to which you have offered to plead guilty today?		
21	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I have.		
22	THE COURT: And are you fully satisfied with Mr.		
23	Brafman's legal representation of you?		
24	THE DEFENDANT: I am.		
25	THE COURT: And are you fully satisfied with the legal		

1 advice that he has given you in this matter?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I am.

THE COURT: So now I'm going to explain certain

Constitutional rights that you have, and pose certain questions about those.

First question is, in that regard, you understand that you have the absolute right to plead not guilty if you wish?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: And under the Constitution and laws of the United States, you, if you determine to plead not guilty, you would be entitled to a speedy and public trial, as you know, even today, if you wanted to, by a jury on the charges contained in the indictment. You realize that?

THE DEFENDANT: I do.

THE COURT: And if you decided to go forward with the trial, you would be presumed to be innocent at the trial. The government would have to prove that you were guilty by competent evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt before you could be found guilty. And a jury would have to agree unanimously that you were guilty. And you would not have to prove that you were innocent. Do you understand those trial rights that you will be giving up by pleading guilty today?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: Also, at the trial if you elected to go forward and have one, and at every stage of your case, you

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would be entitled to be represented by an attorney, as you are today and have been throughout these proceedings. And if you could not afford an attorney, one would be appointed at public expense to represent you; do you realize that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: Also during a trial, during the trial, if you elected to have one, the witnesses for the government would have to come to Court and testify in your presence. Your attorney could cross-examine the witnesses for the government, he could object to evidence offered by the government, and he could offer evidence and subpoena witnesses on your behalf; do you realize that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: Also at a trial, if you elected to have one, although you would have the right to testify if you chose to do so, you would also have the right not to testify, and no one, including particularly the jury, could draw any inference or suggestion of guilt from the fact that you did not testify, if that's what you chose to do. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And even now, this morning, as you're entering this guilty plea, you still have the right to change your mind and to plead not guilty and to go to trial on the charges set forth in the indictment; is that your understanding?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it is.

THE COURT: If you do plead guilty this morning and if I accept the guilty plea, then you will be giving up your right to have a trial, and the other rights I have been discussing with you, and there will be no trial, but I will still enter a judgment of guilty against you. Do you realize that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: And I will, thereafter, not today, sometime -- we'll pick a date at the end of this proceeding -- on the basis of your guilty plea after I have considered what's called a presentence investigation report that is prepared in the normal course by the probation department, and any submissions I might get from Mr. Brafman and from Ms. Cohen, prior to sentencing. Do you realize that?

THE DEFENDANT: I do.

THE COURT: So, Mr. D'Souza, have you received and reviewed a copy of the indictment in this case, which contains the charges against you?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I have.

THE COURT: And have you discussed, fully, with Mr. Brafman, those charges in the indictment, in particular, count one to which you intend to plead guilty this morning?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor, I have.

THE COURT: And, again, I know I have asked this before, but it is important to underscore. Are you fully

satisfied with Mr. Brafman's legal representation of you in this matter?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I am.

THE COURT: And are you fully satisfied with the legal advice that he has given you?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: So I'm just going to briefly summarize count one. Of course the indictment in the case speaks for itself, and it is incorporated by reference. But it says in count one, in sum and substance, that in or about August 2012, in the Southern District of New York, the defendant, Mr.

D'Souza willfully and knowingly made, and caused to be made, contributions of money, aggregating more than \$10,000 during the 2012 calendar year, in the names of other people, to the campaign of a candidate for — a New York candidate for United States Senate, to wit, Mr. D'Souza reimbursed others with whom he was associated, and who he had directed to contribute a total of \$20,000 to the campaign of Ms. Wendy Long.

Ms. Cohen, did you want to add anything to that summary of count one?

MS. COHEN: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Brafman?

MR. BRAFMAN: No, sir.

THE COURT: Okay. So now if we could discuss for a moment, Mr. D'Souza, the maximum possible sentence you could

receive for this crime. This does not mean that you will receive the maximum possible sentence, but it is important that you know what the maximums are before we have a knowing and voluntary plea.

So, first of all, do you understand that the maximum term of imprisonment that is possible is two years of incarceration?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: And do you understand that the maximum term of supervised release, which is the period of supervision by the probation department that follows any incarceration, the maximum term of supervised release in this case is three years?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: And do you understand that the maximum fine that could be imposed upon you in this matter is the greatest of \$250,000, or twice the gross pecuniary gain derived from the offense, or twice the gross pecuniary loss to persons other than yourself resulting from the offense.

Do you realize that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: And do you know that, in any event, there is a 100-dollar special assessment that is mandatory and will be imposed upon you?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: And do you understand that a felony

adjudication, which this would be, count one of the indictment is a felony, may result in your being deprived of certain rights that you would otherwise have, including the right to vote, the right to hold public office, the right to serve on a jury, and the right to possess a firearm.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: Ms. Cohen, I take it this is not a situation where restitution will come into play; is that right?

MS. COHEN: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: And do you understand, Mr. D'Souza, that we have no parole in the federal system, which is where we are today.

THE DEFENDANT: I do.

THE COURT: And do you understand that -- I mentioned this very briefly a minute or so ago. But in addition to any incarceration, you could be subject to a period of what we call supervised release following any incarceration; do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: And do you know that with respect to supervised release, there might very well be terms and -- if it were imposed -- there might very well be terms and conditions attached. And if you fail to comply with those terms and conditions, you could, following a hearing, be imprisoned. Do

you realize that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: And do you understand that if there were such a hearing, that is to say a hearing as to whether you were in compliance with the terms and conditions of supervised release, that would be a nonjury proceeding simply before me as the sentencing judge?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Are you serving any other sentences, State or federal, or being prosecuted in any other courts for any other crimes at this time?

THE DEFENDANT: No

THE COURT: And I'm sure that Mr. Brafman has, and will going forward, discuss sentencing with you. I just want to make a point about sentencing, which is that the United States Sentencing Guidelines -- I'm sure -- well, I'm not sure everybody is aware of it. But it is common knowledge that they are no longer mandatory and, instead, the sentencing courts in trying to come up with a reasonable sentence, review the factors of a statute called 18 United States Code Section 3553(a). And I just want to touch upon those factors here this morning.

They include, and I will consider, the nature and the circumstances of the offense or crime, as well as the history and characteristics of the defendant. Usually, as I said

before as set forth in the presentence investigation report, that's done, and any submissions I may get from Mr. Brafman and from Ms. Cohen. And we try to accomplish certain objectives in sentencing, which include these: One, is to reflect the seriousness of the offense; another is to promote respect for the law; another is to provide a just punishment; another is to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; another is to protect the public from further crimes; and another is, where needed, to provide the defendant with educational or vocational training or medical care or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.

And in doing all of that, that is to say in reviewing all of those criteria and factors, the sentencing courts look at the kinds of sentences that are available, the kind of sentence and the sentencing range established in the United States Sentencing Guidelines, even though, as I say, those are no longer mandatory. We look at any policy statements issued by the United States Sentencing Commission that may apply to your case. We seek to avoid unwarranted sentencing, sentence disparities among similarly-situated defendants. And in appropriate cases, of which I don't believe this is one, as Ms. Cohen has said, to provide for restitution.

Mr. Brafman, have you had a chance to discuss, even preliminarily, sentencing with Mr. D'Souza?

MR. BRAFMAN: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And do you realize, Mr. D'Souza, that even 1 if you don't like the sentence that I impose, you would not, 2 3 for that reason alone, be able to withdraw today's quilty plea. 4 Do you understand that? 5 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor, I do. 6 THE COURT: So if I could turn for just a moment to 7 the plea agreement in this case. Now, this is a document between the government and the 8 9 defense. It speaks for itself, in its entirety. There are 10 just one, or two, or three provisions that I want to highlight 11 for the purposes of today's sentencing proceedings. 12 So, first of all -- and I'll ask these questions both 13 of counsel and of Mr. D'Souza. 14 There is a provision in the plea agreement that says 15 the sentence to be imposed upon Mr. D'Souza is determined 16 solely by the Court. 17 Now, Ms. Cohen, do you agree with that principle? 18 MS. COHEN: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: And Mr. Brafman? 19 20 MR. BRAFMAN: Yes, sir. 21 THE COURT: Mr. D'Souza, do you understand that? 22 THE DEFENDANT: I do. 23 THE COURT: Then do you think, Mr. D'Souza, that you 24 fully understand the consequences of pleading guilty today?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

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1 THE COURT: Has anybody threatened you, or in any way 2 forced you, to plead guilty? 3 THE DEFENDANT: 4 THE COURT: Including any attorneys. 5 THE DEFENDANT: No. 6 THE COURT: So let's go back for a moment to the plea 7 agreement. It's dated on the first page May 19, and on the last page -- and the document that I am relying on is the one 8 9 that was signed this morning, and signed on May 20, 2014. 10 can find, among others, the following provisions. And again, 11 I'm going to pose these questions of counsel and of Mr. 12 D'Souza. 13 So there is a provision here, Ms. Cohen, that says 14 that the parties agree that the so-called offense level is 12, 15 the criminal, what we call the criminal history category is 1, and the quideline range in this matter is 10 to 16 months of 16 17 incarceration. Is that your understanding? 18 MS. COHEN: Yes, your Honor. 19 THE COURT: And Mr. Brafman, is that yours? 20 MR. BRAFMAN: Yes, sir. 21 THE COURT: Mr. D'Souza, you are aware of that? 22 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I am. 23 THE COURT: There is also a provision that says Mr. 24 D'Souza agrees that he will not seek a two-level reduction in 25 the, what we call the stipulated offense level, for reasons of

acceptance of responsibility. So he will not be seeking such a reduction.

Ms. Cohen, do you understand that to be the case?

MS. COHEN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And Mr. Brafman, do you?

MR. BRAFMAN: Yes, your Honor.

I just wanted the record the reflect that we have agreed that the defendant will not seek a two-level adjustment of the guideline level for acceptance of responsibility, not seek it from the government or from the Court or probation. It is understood that the fact that the defendant has agreed to plead guilty will be an issue that we are able to brief for the Court, to the extent that your Honor wants to consider the fact that he did plead guilty, in determining what the appropriate sentence should be.

THE COURT: I understand that.

And Mr. D'Souza, is that your understanding as well?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it is.

agreement that says -- first it says, or one part of it says that the parties agree that neither an upward -- what we call an upward -- nor downward departure is warranted. And neither party would seek such a departure. But it goes to say that the parties agree -- and this may be what you are referring to, Mr. Brafman, that either party may seek a sentence outside of the

stipulated guideline range, based on the factors that I enumerated a minute or so ago before, under 18 United States Code Section 3553(a).

Ms. Cohen, is it your understanding that that is -- is that a correct summary of those provisions of the plea agreement?

MS. COHEN: Correct. And I believe those were the sections of the guidelines that the defense counsel is referring to regarding arguing his plea should count towards those factors.

THE COURT: Mr. Brafman, did I get that right?

MR. BRAFMAN: Yes, sir. We have the ability to bring factors to the Court under 3553, and request an outside guideline range, but we don't have the right to challenge the computation of the guidelines.

THE COURT: Is that your understanding, as well, Mr. D'Souza?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor, it is.

THE COURT: Okay. And then finally from my perspective in terms of the plea agreement, I do want to talk about a waiver of appeal rights.

There is a provision in this plea agreement which says that there is a waiver of appeal rights. And, in fact, the defendant agrees not to file a direct appeal. It also says that he waives any rights to bring what's called a collateral

challenge, so called habeas challenges, including but not limited to an application under 28 United States Code Sections 2255 and/or 2241. And it also says that Mr. D'Souza waives the right to seek a sentence modification under a section of the Code, 18 United States Code Section 3582(c). And that these waivers apply if the sentence is either within or below the stipulated guideline range, which we identified before as 10 to 16 months of incarceration.

Ms. Cohen, is that a correct summary of the waiver of appeal rights in this case?

MS. COHEN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And Mr. Brafman, do you think that, too?

MR. BRAFMAN: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Mr. D'Souza, are you aware of the fact that you are waiving your rights to appeal in the manner I have just described?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I am.

THE COURT: And, Mr. D'Souza, apart from what is contained in the plea agreement, has anybody made any promise or inducement to cause you to plead guilty today?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: Has anybody made a promise to you as to what sentence you will receive in this case?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: Including any attorneys?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: So I turn to you, Ms. Cohen, and ask you to please summarize for us what you believe the government would be able to prove in terms of evidence if this case were to go to trial, rather than being resolved in this plea allocution here this morning.

MS. COHEN: Your Honor, the government would be able to prove at trial beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty as charged in count one of the indictment. The proof at trial would consist of testimony by the candidate herself, Wendy Long, regarding the individual donation campaign limit of \$5,000 per individual, or \$10,000 for a married couple, as long as they both agreed to allocate it five thousand and five thousand. She would testify that she informed the defendant of those individual donations.

There would be e-mails and other documents showing that the defendant was aware of that limit, that he e-mailed back to Ms. Long acknowledging his understanding of that individual donation limit.

There would be testimony by the individuals whom he asked to make the illegal conduit contributions through. That is Tyler Vawser, an individual that worked for the defendant both when he was President of King's College, which is where he worked at the time of the offense, as well as worked for him separately scheduling his engagements.

There would also be testimony by Denise Joseph -THE COURT: Tyler Vawser and his wife, as well? Or
no.

MS. COHEN: Yes, your Honor.

With respect to Tyler Vawser, Tyler Vawser would testify at trial that the defendant asked him to make a donation to the Wendy Long campaign. The amount of that donation was \$10,000. That he made that donation on behalf of himself and his wife. That the defendant reimbursed him, either that day or the next day as he promised he would do when he asked him to make the contribution.

The testimony at trial would also show that the time the defendant asked Mr. Vawser to make that donation, that the defendant knew what he was doing was wrong.

The defendant, when he asked Tyler Vawser to make that donation, Tyler Vawser immediately asked the defendant if it was okay to make the donation, and the defendant told him to not worry about it. Words to the effect of you support Ms. Long, you know her, that's what you can tell anyone who asks about it.

The evidence at trial would also show, through testimony of Denise Joseph, that the defendant, that same day as he asked Tyler Vawser to make the illegal donation, also asked Ms. Joseph to make a 10,000 donation on behalf of herself and her spouse at the time. That she communicated with her

spouse, Dr. Joseph, about the donation. That he wrote a check to the Long campaign either that day or the next day for \$10,000. That the defendant, again as he promised to do when he asked her to make the donation, he paid her back the \$10,000.

Both of the reimbursements for donations were made in cash by the defendant, so that he handed \$10,000 in cash both to Tyler Vawser and to Denise Joseph. They would testify about that at trial.

In addition, there would be bank records showing the deposit of that money by Tyler Vawser and Denise Joseph on or about the day they also wrote the checks to the Long campaign.

In addition, at trial, Ms. Long would testify that she asked the defendant specifically about these two donations, the donations by Tyler Vawser and Denise Joseph and their respective spouses. And that, initially, her concerns were centered around the Josephs' donation. And that the defendant told her, in sum or substance, not to worry about it, that there was nothing wrong with the donations. But that, later after the election, much after the election, that Wendy Long again pressed the defendant. And this time about both donations, the Vawser donation and Josephs' donations. And during that discussion, the defendant admitted that he had reimbursed the both of them for their donations, but told Wendy Long, who expressed her concern, that he had done that, and he

told Wendy Long that she shouldn't worry about it because she had not known a thing about it.

Your Honor, we would also show at trial, official documents bank records, the filings in the case, we would also present proof obviously on count two of the indictment, and we are confident that, at a trial, through the trial testimony, and also through all of the documents that we would seek to introduce, that the government would be able to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant here is guilty of count one.

THE COURT: And you would show that the -- you may have said this. That these two ten thousand dollar contributions were made in or around August 2012.

MS. COHEN: Correct, your Honor. The checks were
August 19, 2012 by the Vassars. And by the Josephs, on
August 20, 2012. And the deposit slips reflecting the \$10,000
cash reimbursement from the defendant to the Vassars and
Josephs is, I believe, on August 20 and 21, respectively.

THE COURT: And by way of background, also, would you establish that, in February I believe it is, of 2012, Mr.

D'Souza and his wife had made a -- maxed out, so to speak, by making their own five and five or 10,000-dollar contribution to the Wendy Long campaign.

MS. COHEN: Yes, your Honor.

We would present evidence, both through Ms. Long and

through the documents themselves, which would be a check that the defendant wrote to the Long campaign making a donation in March of 2012 to the Long campaign in the amount of \$10,000 on behalf of himself and his wife. And that he then subsequently a form authorizing the campaign to split that donation equally between himself and his wife, \$5,000 each.

THE COURT: And lastly, how would you establish venue for purposes of this case?

MS. COHEN: Your Honor, the defendant, when he asked Mr. Vawser and Ms. Joseph to make the fraudulent donations, that request was made in the Southern District of New York at the King's College which is located in Manhattan.

THE COURT: Thank you.

So turning to Mr. D'Souza, in light of the presentation made by the government as to what it believes it would be able to prove if this case were to proceed to trial, and also in light of the questions I have asked you up until now, this morning, and the answers you have given, is it your wish at this time to plead guilty or not guilty to count one of the indictment?

THE DEFENDANT: Guilty, your Honor.

THE COURT: So would you please tell me then, Mr.

D'Souza, in your own words, exactly what it is that you did

that makes you believe that you violated -- well, that you are

guilty of what is charged in count one of the indictment, which

is the making of contributions in the names of others, aggregating more than \$10,000 during the 2012 calendar year election cycle of the Wendy Long campaign.

THE DEFENDANT: In August of 2012, in the Southern District of New York, I caused two close associates to contribute \$10,000, each, to the U.S. Senate campaign of Wendy Long, with the understanding that I would then reimburse them for their contributions. I did reimburse them. I knew that causing the campaign contribution to be made in the name of another was wrong, and something the law forbids. I deeply regret my conduct.

THE COURT: And are you pleading guilty to this crime because you are, in fact, guilty of it?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And, Ms. Cohen, do you believe that there is a sufficient factual predicate for Mr. D'Souza's guilty plea?

MS. COHEN: Yes, your Honor. And I believe the defendant's allocution meets all of the elements of the charged crime.

THE COURT: And Mr. Brafman, do you, as well?

MR. BRAFMAN: Yes, sir.

May I just add something? We accept the recitation of evidence that Ms. Cohen put on the record, the substance. And we accept the fact that the government had sufficient proof

beyond a reasonable doubt to convict the defendant of count one, if he had proceeded to trial. Without endorsing every single word that she said. Because I want to, in the sentencing memorandum, place the defendant's conduct in context, so that your Honor understands the full picture. But we don't dispute the fact that the government could prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. And that the defendant has an adequate basis to allocute. And that he did so effectively.

Thank you, sir.

THE COURT: Thank you. I agree with both of you, as well, that there is a sufficient factual predicate for this guilty plea. And it is the finding of this Court, in this matter, United States v. Dinesh D'Souza, that the defendant is fully competent and capable of entering an informed plea, that he is aware of the nature of the charges against him and the consequences of pleading guilty, and that the plea is a knowing and voluntary plea supported by an independent basis which, in fact, supports each of the essential elements of the crime charged in count one of the indictment.

It is the further finding of the Court that Mr.

D'Souza is also fully aware of the potential consequences that result from waiving his appeal rights, and that he has done so both voluntarily and knowingly within the confines of the plea agreement and also, here, during the plea allocution this morning.

Consequently, the plea is therefore accepted. And Mr. D'Souza is now adjudged guilty of the offense charged in count one of the indictment.

Mr. Brafman, is there any reason in your opinion why I should not direct that a presentence investigation report be prepared?

MR. BRAFMAN: No, sir.

THE COURT: And do you wish to be present in connection with any interview of Mr. D'Souza?

MR. BRAFMAN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: So I hereby order that a presentence investigation report be made, but that there be no interview of Mr. D'Souza unless Mr. Brafman is given the opportunity to be present.

And I say this, which we commonly say, Mr. D'Souza, it is in your best interest to cooperate with the probation department who prepares the presentence report, since the report will be important in my decision as to what is an appropriate sentence in this case. So it's my suggestion that you tell them whatever they ask, consulting of course with your attorney, both the good things and not-so-good things. Because if you don't disclose something that they may ask about, and they, being the probation department, find it out themselves, they may say that you were not being truthful with them and that would not be helpful to you.

You, and Mr. Brafman, and the government counsel will have a right and the opportunity to examine the presentence report before the sentencing date, and to file any objections that you may have.

And so I urge you, Mr. D'Souza, to review the presentence report carefully with Mr. Brafman and to discuss it with him before sentencing. If there are any mistakes in the report, please point them out to him so that he can point them out to me before the sentencing, and so that I don't proceed on the basis of mistaken information.

Counsel, I was intending to set the sentencing down for 11:00 a.m. on September 23, 2014, if that works for all of you.

MS. COHEN: Fine with the government, your Honor.

MR. BRAFMAN: That's fine, Judge. Thank you.

THE COURT: And at that occasion, both Mr. D'Souza and counsel will of course have the opportunity to be heard.

I would ask, Mr. Brafman, if you, as I'm certain you will, are intending to make a written submission, if you would be so kind as to file that with the clerk of court and on ECF by September 1, 2014.

And then Ms. Cohen, if you are intending to respond to that submission, if you would do so by September 8, 2014.

Okay. I don't see any reason to impact the current bail situation.

I do have to say, I have to remind everybody, including Mr. D'Souza, that you need to appear of course in court for sentencing at 11:00 a.m. on September 23, 2014. And that any failure to appear at that time could be a criminal offense, separate crime, and could subject you to a fine and/or a prison term of up to five years in addition to whatever other sentence I might impose for the crime for which you just pled guilty.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And, Ms. Cohen, you indicated early on --well, I think you did, that you would resolve any outstanding other counts with respect to this indictment. Or did you want to wait to do that at sentencing.

MS. COHEN: Yes, your Honor, we would do that after sentencing.

THE COURT: Okay.

Did you wish to add anything else to this proceeding?

MS. COHEN: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Brafman?

MR. BRAFMAN: No, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: And this last question is, is the government satisfied with the guilty plea allocution today?

MS. COHEN: Yes, your Honor. We believe it meets all of the elements of the charged crime in count one.

E5k0dsop THE COURT: And Mr. Brafman, you, as well? MR. BRAFMAN: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Okay. I think that concludes our work for today. Thank you very much, and I'll see you in September. MS. COHEN: Thank you, your Honor. THE COURT: You bet. (Adjourned)